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[L. A. No. 21634. In Bank. Mar. 3, 1952.]

HOMER J. HOSTETTER, .Appellant, v. JOHN H . .ALDERSON et al., Respondents.
[1] Administrative Law-Court Review of Administrative Action
-Remedies.-While an action for declaratory relief is not
appropriate for review of an administrative order, the complaint may be regarded as a petition for a writ of mandate.
[2] Municipal Corporations-Fire Department--Removal of Members- Complaint and Charges. -Complaint or charge filed
against city fireman for "physical inability to properly perform the duties required of all uniformed personnel, . . . such
inability caused by illness incurred not in line of duty as
determined by competent medical authority after thorough
examination," is sufficiently specific to permit the accused to
identify the transaction, understand the nature of the alleged
offense, and prepare and present his defense; it is not necessary to plead the facts concerning his illness, its nature, cause,
and duration.
[3] Id.- Fire Department- Removal of Members- Grounds.Los Angeles city charter, § 182, declaring that a fireman
may not be deprived of his position except for sufficient cause
shown on a finding of guilty of the specific charge assigned,
is not intended merely to provide a means of disciplinary
action for an offense committed; loss of efficiency to the fire
department, rather than personal fault or misconduct, is the
primary consideration, and physical disability resulting from
illness not incurred in line of duty may be a sufficient cause
for removal.
[ 4] Id.-Fire Department--Retirement of Members.-Los Angeles
city charter, § 182, providing for retirement of firemen disabled in line of duty, does not apply to a fireman whose illness
was not service connected.
[5] Id.-Fire Department--Removal of Members-Hearing.-City
fireman charged with physical inability properly to perform
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Administrative Law, § 199; Am.Jur., Public
Administrative Law, § 231.
[3] Physical or mental disability as disqualification or ground
of removal or impeachment of public officer, note, 28 A.L.R. 777.
See, also, Cal.Jur., Public Officers, § 151; Am.Jur., Public Officers,
§ 194.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Administrative Law, § 19; [2-6] Municipal Corporations, § 324(2).
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the duties of his position was not found guilty solely on
hearsay evidence where he admitted his inability to perform
his duties and pleaded guilty to the charge against him.
[6] !d.-Fire Department-Removal of Members-Hearing.-City
fireman charged with physical inability properly to perform
the duties of his position was afforded a fair and impartial
hearing where he was given every opportunity to present his
case in person and by counsel of his own choosing, and where
there is no allegation or showing of bad faith or oppression
on the part of the board hearing the charge .

.APPE.AL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
.Angeles County. Charles .A. Paulsen, Judge.* .Affirmed .
.Action seeking restoration to position in city fire department. Judgment for defendants affirmed.
George E. Cryer and R. .Alston J"ones for .Appellant.
Ray L. Chesebro, City .Attorney (Los .Angeles), Bourke
Jones, .Assistant City .Attorney, George William .Adams and
John F. Feldmeier, Deputy City .Attorneys, for Respondents.
EDMONDS, J.-Homer J. Hostetter was removed from
his position as a fireman of the city of Los .Angeles following
a hearing before the board of rights. He then filed in the
superior court a complaint for declaratory relief. .After
trial, judgment was entered against him upon the ground
that he was legally discharged. His appeal is from that judgment.
Hostetter's complaint names as defendants the city of
Los .Angeles and John H . .Alderson, chief engineer and general manager of its fire department. The relief demanded
is restoration to his position with full pay from the date
of his removal. [1] .An action for declaratory relief is not
appropriate for review of an administrative order. (See
lOth Biennial Report of the Judicial Council of California,
137.) However, the complaint may be regarded as a petition for a writ of mandate. (See Boren v. State Personnel
Board, 37 Cal.2d 634, 638 [234 P.2d 981] .)
Hostetter alleges that .Alderson issued an order temporarily
relieving him from duty pending a hearing and decision by
the board of rights on charges preferred under section 135
*Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council.
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of the charter of the city of Los Angeles. The charges, as
set forth in the order served upon Hostetter, are: "For your
physical inability to properly perform the duties required
of all uniformed personnel, at the expiration of your vacation . . . as provided in section 132 of the Rules and Regulations governing the department, such inability caused by
illness incurred not in line of duty as determined by competent medical authority after thorough examination.''
Other allegations of the complaint are that at the board
of rights hearing only hearsay evidence was introduced as
to his physical ability. Following the hearing, the board
found him "guilty" and fixed the "penalty" to be imposed
as "removal" from his position. Later, certain claims and
demands for compensation and reinstatement and a request
for rehearing by the board were filed. In conclusion, Hostetter
asserts that a controversy exists as to the validity and effect
of the proceedings against him.
In their answer, Alderson and the city state that Hostetter
was present in person and represented by counsel of his own
choosing at the board hearing and that he admitted his guilt
of the charges filed against him. There was no objection to
any of the evidence offered or received and Hostetter introduced evidence on his own behalf.
The record of the board hearing shows that Hostetter was
present with counsel. Offered the opportunity of pleading
guilty or not guilty, he replied: ''Gentlemen, as the service
demands fire duty, my answer is guilty, however if the service demands other duties my answer is not guilty and I
would like my representative to explain this more fully."
His counsel then elaborated, saying, " . . . yes the boy is
guilty as charged in the Rules and Regulations read by you
in which it says it may demand the duties of him as a part
of the Fire Department . . . I would like at this time to
enter a plea of guilty to the charges and ask for a suspension
from the department of six months, at the expiration of such
time he will have to submit to a complete medical examination . . . if he is found capable of performing fire duty he
will be restored at that time.''
In effect, Hostetter's defense at the hearing was that he
was too ill to perform full duties; however, he could do light
work and at some future time return to full duty. He introduced into evidence letters from various doctors indicating
that improvement in his condition might be expected. The
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record shows that he had requested, and been denied, an additional leave of absence to recover his health.
It appears that less than two weeks after completing his
period of probation and becoming a fireman, Hostetter was
discovered to be suffering from hyperthyroidism. Since that
time he has been absent from duty 154 days. He received
repeated leaves and vacations to permit him to attempt to
recover his health. He was advised by his superiors to see)>:
employment better suited to his physical condition and to
resign from the force. Numerous records, reports and letters
were introduced indicating Hostetter's unfitness for duty,
the leaves which had been accorded him, and the treatment
which he had received. One of his superiors testified that,
during the period Hostetter was on active duty, he was a
good fireman. In determining ''the proper penalty to be
prescribed,'' the board examined his personal file in his presence.
Following a trial before the court without a jury, the superior court rendered a declaratory judgment denying Hostetter any relief and holding that he had been legally discharged
from his position for good and sufficient cause upon a fair
and regular hearing.
Hostetter contends that the board of rights was without
jurisdiction to proceed with the hearing because the complaint does not state a charge against him under section 135
of the city charter. He claims first that the complaint does
not contain a statement in clear and concise language of all
the facts constituting the charge, and second, that physical
disability is not a ground for dismissal within the meaning
of the charter section. The other points relied upon are that
he was not afforded a fair and impartial hearing and that
he was convicted solely on hearsay evidence.
[2] Hostetter's first objection is to the grammatical construction of the charge filed against him. He contends that
it is not a complete sentence, but a mere series of phrases
not constituting a charge of any kind. However, despite
grammatical weakness, the charge clearly and concisely
states that Hostetter does not have the physical ability properly to perform his duties. It is sufficiently specific to permit the accused to identify the transaction, understand the
nature of the alleged offense, and prepare and present his
defense. ( Gipner v. State Civil Service Com., 13 Cal.App.2d
100, 107 [56 P.2d 535].) It was not necessary to plead the
facts concerning his illness, its nature, cause, and duration.
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The decisive question is whether the charter provides for
dismissal because of physical difficulties.
Hostetter contends that physical disability is not a sufficient cause for removal under section 135 of the charter
of the city of Los Angeles. His position is that this section
is intended to provide a means of disciplinary action for an
offense committed by a fireman, and that physical illness
cannot be properly described as misconduct. He relies upon
specific wording in the charter as tending to support his
claim.
Paragraph one of section 135 provides that no officer or
employee may be "suspended, removed, deprived of his office
or position, or otherwise separated from the service of the
Fire Department (other than by resignation), except for
good and sufficient cause shown upon a finding of 'guilty'
of the specific charge or charges assigned . . . '' after a proper
hearing before the board of rights. (Italics added.) The
paragraph further specifies that the charge must be based
upon some act committed or omitted within one year prior
to the filing of the complaint.
Paragraph 12 of the same section prescribes the procedure
to be followed in the hearing before the board of rights. "The
departmental personal history and records of the accused
shall not be available to the Board of Rights except and only
in such cases where the accused has been found guilty of
any charge upon which he was heard or tried by the Board
of Rights, then only for the purpose of determining a proper
penalty to be prescribed; provided, however, that in prescribing such penalty the said board must look to the nature and
gravity of the offense of which the accused has been found
guilty and may at its discretion review the departmental
personal history and record of such accused. . . . '' From
"penalty" and "gravity of the offense'' Hostetter concludes
that the section is to be confined to one of punishment for
misconduct.
[3] Although the phraseology of section 135 is somewhat
inartistic, it does not necessarily mean that by inclusion of
language possibly indicating a primary intent to ,punish for
misconduct, inability to perform the duties of the position
should not also be ground for removal. A comparable provision is found in the Governmrnt Coqe in sections 19570 et
seq. which concern disciplinary proceedings before the Civil
Service Commission. Section 19570 defines ''punitive action''
as dismssal, demotion, suspension, or other disciplinary ac-
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tion. Section 19572, which for the most part enumerates acts
of misconduct as cause for discipline, includes physical and
mental disability.
A more pertinent inquiry is that of the basic policies behind
this type of charter provision. In other jurisdictions having
municipal charter provisions similar to the present one, it
has been held that the best efficiency is obtained in public
service when personnel are selected according to qualifications
and positions are retained without fear of removal for reasons
of local politics. (White v. City of Hopkinsville, 280 Ky.
661 [134 S.W.2d 236, 238] .) Courts have also upheld the
policy that the public is best served when department officials are permitted to eliminate unqualified or undesirable
personnel, and to replace them with persons better qualified.
(City of Wewoka v. Rodman, 172 Okla. 630 [46 P .2d 334,
336] ; Hunter Quick, 183 Okla. 19 [79 P.2d 590, 593] .)
In numerous decisions, the discharge or retirement of
public employees physically or mentally unable to perform
the duties called for in their positions has been upheld. (See
Annotation, 28 A.L.R. 777; Loucks v. Board of Education,
258 App.Div. 1003 [16 N.Y.S.2d 733] ; Balacek v. Board of
Trustees, 263 App.Div. 712 [30 N.Y.S.2d 1007] ; Sganga v.
Teaneck Tp., 130 N.J.L. 218 [32 A.2d 505] ; School Dist. No.1
v. Teachers' Retirement lhtnd Assn., 163 Ore. 103 [95 P.2d
720, 96 P.2d 419, 125 A.L.R. 720]; In re Carney, 182 Va. 907
[30 S.E.2d 789].) In Gentner v. Board of Education, 219
Cal. 135 [25 P.2d 824], and Tilton v. Board of Education, 25
Cal.App.2d 746 [78 P.2d 474], schoolteachers were retired
because of physical disability. In the Tilton case, in commenting upon the Gentner decision, it was said: "The reasoning in that case dictates the conclusion that where, as in the
instant case, the school board was justified in retiring a
teacher because of physical disability to perform her duties,
it became the board's duty to remove the teacher from the
classroom, . . . Such a conclusion finds support in the basic
principle underlying our school system-that the welfare of
the children is the paramount consideration." (P. 749.)
It is apparent that there is no fault on the part of Hostetter or intimation that he has in any way been guilty
of misconduct. But personal fault does not appear to be
the primary consideration. Misconduct is important only
insofar as it affects the efficiency of the department. The
loss of efficiency to the department, and the detriment to
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the public which would result from lack of authority to discharge a physically disabled fireman, is a sound basis for concluding that" sufficient cause" should be construed as physical
disability resulting from illness not incurred in the line of
duty.
If section 135 is given the construction urged by Hostetter,
the charter makes no provision for the suspension or removal
of a fireman in his situation because of nonservice connected
disability. [4] Hostetter argues that his was a case for
retirement under section 182 and that he was entitled to
a hearing before the Board of Pension Commissioners. However, that section applies only to a fireman disabled in the
line of duty. Hostetter admits that his illness was not service connected.
Section 1821;4 provides for retirement of a fireman who is
disabled other than in the line of duty, provided he has
served in the department for five years or more since the
date of his last appointment. Hostetter's illness occurred
almost immediately following his appointment and his total
length of service is considerably short of five years.
Section 108 permits the transfer of physically disabled personnel to other civil service departments, but only in the
event that the employee has served for at least three years,
or has become disabled because of injury or illness resulting
from the discharge of his duties. Hostetter meets neither
qualification.
[5] Hostetter argues that he was found guilty solely upon
hearsay evidence. The record does not support his contention. He admitted his inability to perform his duties and
pleaded guilty to the charge against him. No evidence was
required or taken upon the question of guilt. The records
and papers introduced were solely for the purpose of enabling
the board to determine the penalty to be prescribed.
[6] A thorough review of the record of the board hearing
fails to disclose any unfairness therein. Hostetter was given
every opportunity to present his case in person and by counsel
of hili' own choosing. There is no allegation of bad faith or
oppression on the part of the board, and none appears from
the record. Hostetter's claim that Chief Alderson was unfairly prejudiced against him is not sustained by the evidence,
nor is it shown that, even if such prejudice existed, it affected
the decison of the board.
As the uncontradicted evidence shows facts justifying Hostetter's dismissal from the fire department, he is not entitled
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to relief either in this action or by way of mandate.
judgment is affirmed.

The

Gibson, 0. J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
Section 135 ( 1) of the charter of the city of Los Angeles
provides that: "The right of an officer or employee of the
Fire Department to hold his office or position and to the
compensation attached to such office or position is hereby
declared to be a substantial property right of which he shall
not be deprt>ued arbitrarily or summarily, nor otherwise than
as herein in this section provided. No officer or employee of
the Fire Department shall be sttspended, 1·ernoved, dep1·ived
of his office or position, or otherw1:se sepamted from the service of the Fire Department, (other than by resignation)
except for good and sufficient cmtse shown upon a finding
of 'guilty' of the specific charge or charges assigned as cause
or causes therefor after a full, fair and impartial hearing
before the Board of Rights . . . . " It is also provided that
the charge must be based on some act committed or omitted
within one year prior to the filing of the complaint.
Section 135(12) provides in part that the "Board of Rights,
shall at the conclusion of the hearing, make its specific findings of 'guilty' or 'not guilty' (on each specific charge) which
must be based upon the evidence adduced before it at such
hearing and not otherwise and render and certify its decision
in writing.''
The only charge against plaintiff was that he was in ill
health and unable to perform his duties because of physical
disability. The two paragraphs of section 135 of the charter
above quoted certainly connote some sort of misconduct. It
appears to me that it takes quite a stretch of the imagination
to say that one may be fmtnd "guilty" or "not guilty" of
poor health. It most assuredly is not something over which
an individual has any control.
The majority, in holding that plaintiff may be removed
from the fire department under the quoted provisions of the
charter, say that a comparable provision is found in section
19570 et seq. of the Government Code. I most emphatically
do not agree. Section 19572 (e) of that code provides specifically that an employee may be disciplined for physical or
mental disability. No such provision is made in the section
here under consideration.
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Section 182% of the charter provides for retirement of
a :fireman who is disabled other than in the line of duty, provided he has served in the department for five years or more
since the date of his last appointment. Plaintiff's illness
oceurred shortly after he had served his probationary period
and so he does not come within this provision. Section 108
permits the transfer of physically disabled personnel to other
civil service departments in the event that the employee
has served for at least three years, or has become disabled
because of service-connected disability. Plaintiff does not
come within this category either, so there is very clearly a
hiatus in the charter whieh the majority has filled by indulging in judicial legislation. Since no provision was made
for disability which was not service connected and which
occurred prior to the five year period of service, this court
decides that plaintiff can be removed from his position upon
a finding of "guilty" of poor health.
The majority opinion contains the following statement:
''In numerous decisions, the discharge or retirement of public employees physically or mentally unable to perform the
duties called for in their positions has been upheld." This
statement is allegedly supported by the following authorities
which, in my opinion, are all distinguishable from the case
under consideration.
In In re Carney, 182 Va. 907 [30 S.E.2d 789], the act involved provided that: "Whenever the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia shall have reasonable cause to believe that
the judge of any court of record in this State . . . is afflicted
with an illness or disability, mental or physical, which renders
such judge . . . permanently incapacitated or incompetent
to discharge the duties of his office, it shall be the duty of
the Court to enter an order directing an inquiry to determine such judge's . . . capacity and competency. . . . " (Italics added.) This case involved a situation where there was
specific statutory authority for removal or retirement of the
judge from office.
In Sganga v. Teaneck Tp., 130 N.J.L. 218 [32 A.2d 505],
there was no discharge involved. A police officer, due to defective vision, was unable to perform any police duties other
than desk work and the court held that the township was
justified in denying him a pension and in putting him on sick
leave at half salary.
In Balacek v. Board of Trustees, 263 App.Div. 712 [30
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N.Y.S.2d 1007], a fireman who was found to be totally and
permanently physically unfit for duty was retired, apparently
at an annual pension.
In Lo1wks v. Board of Education, 258 App.Div. 1003 [16
N.Y.S.2d 733], a schoolteacher was dismissed for physical
disability. But there is nothing in the case to show whether
or not any particular legislative act was involved.
In Gentner v. Board of Education, 219 Cal. 135 [25 P.2d
824], a schoolteacher who had, because of the Teachers'
Tenure Law, achieved the status of a "permanent teacher"
was dismissed because of incompetence and unfitness to teach.
The School Code in effect at that time (Stats. 1933, ch. 391,
p. 1017) provided for dismissal for "immoral or unprofessional conduct, commission or aiding or advocating the commission of acts of criminal syndicalism . . . dishonesty, incompetency, evident unfitness for service, persistent violation
of or refusal to obey the school laws of California, or reasonable regulations prescribed for the government of public
schools." This case presents another example of dismissal
in accordance with specific statutory authority.
In Tilton v. Board of Education, 25 Cal.App.2d 746 [78
P .2d 474], a teacher was retired for physical incapacity (defective hearing) and the question presented for determination was whether she was to be given active employment from
the date of her retirement until her dismissal at the end of
the year. She was retired pursuant to the provisions of section 5.890 of the School Code and no question was raised as
to the propriety of her eligibility for retirement or as to the
physical facts which necessitated it.
In School District No. 1 v. Teachers' Retirement Fund
Assn., 163 Ore. 103 [95 P.2d 720, 96 P.2d 419, 125 A.L.R.
720], a statute which provided for a pension plan for teachers
under the age of 60 who should become disabled by reason
of illness or accident was involved. The board of directors
of the school district adopted a rule requiring every applicant
to take a medical examination and where a physical disability
was discovered, the applicant was to sign a waiver of any
claim for disability benefits from the Teachers' Retirement
Fund Association. The waivers were held void as contrary
to public policy.
I have no quarrel with cases holding that a public employee may be retired on a pension or removed from office
or position for physical disability when there is statutory
authority therefor. I do object strenuously to such judicial
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legislation as is found in the majority opinion. If the legislative body intends that an employee, in the position of the
plaintiff here, may be removed from his position, it is its sole
prerogative to say so. It is not the function of this court
to determine that the charter provision, so obviously meant
to provide for the discharge of an employee guilty of misconduct, applies to one suffering from a physical disability.
If, as I am convinced it does, the charter makes no provision
for the removal of a person in the category in which plaintiff finds himself, undoubtedly the situation could be remedied
by the pr·oper authorities in a very short period of time. It
is not the duty of this court to supply the missing links in
the legislative chain.
I would, therefore, reverse the judgment with directions
to the trial court to enter judgment in favor of plaintiff
directing his restoration to his position in the Department of
Fire of the City of Los Angeles without loss of pay.
Shenk, J., concurred.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied March 31,
1952. Shenk, J., and Carter, J., were of the opinion that the
petition should be granted.

[L. A. No. 21820. In Bank. Mar. 3, 1952.]

CITY OF VERNON et al., Petitioners, v. SUPERIOR
COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY et al., Respondents.
[1] Injunctions- Violation- Certainty.- Petitioners cannot be
guilty of contempt if the injunction which they violated is so
uncertain that they could not determine what it required them
to do.
[2] Id.-Judgment.-In California resort may be had to the findings of fact and conclusions of law to clarify any uncertainty
or ambiguity in an injunction.
[1] See Cal.Jur., Injunctions, § 78; Am.Jur., Injunctions, § 334.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Injunctions, § 91; [2, 3, 5] Injunctions, §74; [4] Injunctions, §109(2); [6,7] Contempt, §42; [8]
Contempt, §55; [9,11] Contempt, §56; [10] Contempt, §80;
[12, 13 J Contempt, § 32; [14] Injunctions, § 90.5; [15] Contempt,
§ 68.

